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Abstract
Located at the ancient sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi is a collection of inscriptions that detail the sales of
slaves by their owners to the god Apollo. In reality, these slaves were purchasing their freedom, and the
Delphic inscriptions are the manumission contracts between slave and slave owner. But how did the
Greeks reconcile the integration of slaves into free civilization with their established systems and
rationalizations surrounding slavery? My project investigates the Delphic approach to manumission,
using the manumission inscriptions in conjunction with evidence from other locales to examine the
circumstances and methods that would enable a slave to achieve freedom through the Delphic procedure.
Close reading and consideration of these inscriptions reveal a tension between the many advantages
manumission offered to slaveowners, and the centuries of alienation and objectification of the slave figure
to the appellation of merely σῶµα ("body"). This tension, and other evidence of Greek discomfort and
anxiety concerning boundary-crossing and categorical dilemmas, may help explain the strange role of the
god in the Delphic epigraphy.

Ancient Greece was not only a society dependent on slave labor, but also one that took
the enslavement of other human beings for granted as a fact of human life.1 Yet there is ample
evidence—some literary, but primarily epigraphic—that there existed the opportunity for an
escape from servitude in Greece, and that manumission may even have been a commonplace
practice. Notably, the evidence for manumission is more limited in larger cities like Athens,
Corinth, and Thebes; most of the known manumission inscriptions have been found in other
regions of northern and central Greece, including locations like Thessaly, Boeotia, Elateia, and
Phocis. The Delphic sanctuary of Apollo houses the largest of these epigraphic collections.2 The
degree to which the evidence from Delphi, or indeed from any of these places, is representative
of Greek manumission as a whole is still up for debate, due to the scattered nature of the
evidence (perhaps as a result of these regions’ particular recording habits) and its confinement to
particular periods of time. In other words, a location’s manumission inscriptions can only really
speak to the manumission procedure of that location at that time, at least without a comparative
study.3
1

Finley, “Was Greek Civilization Based on Greek Labour?,” in Slavery in Classical Antiquity, ed. Moses Finley
(Cambridge: Heffer, 1968) 53.
2
Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free : The Concept of Manumission and the Status of Manumitted Slaves in the
Ancient Greek World (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 2-3.
3
Ibid.
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Still, the individual collections are informatively fruitful, especially one as abundant and
detailed as Delphi’s. Of particular interest for this discussion is the representation of the slave in
the majority of Delphic manumission inscriptions by the word σῶµα (“body”), which provides an
unfortunate reminder of the initial status that he or she occupied in servitude. How did the
Greeks approach the transformation of a σῶµα—a slave alienated, objectified, and stripped of
legal rights to the point of being what Patterson labels “socially dead”4—into a free human
being? How was this even possible logically and logistically in a society that participated in the
systematic subjugation and exploitation of masses of people? The inscriptions at Delphi are
valuable resources for examining how the Greeks effected the manumission of slaves, and how
they conceived of manumission.

Overview of the Delphic Manumission Epigraphy
The body of manumission inscriptions in the ancient sanctuary of Delphi records the
release of over 1200 individuals from slavery. Dating between 201 BCE and roughly 100 CE, the
inscriptions that survive lie primarily on the polygonal masonry comprising the terrace wall of
the temple of Apollo—some can also be found in other locations around the site, such as on
public monuments along the Sacred Way and the theater.5 Through the particular process
documented at Delphi (the cases of which number over a thousand), manumission took the form
of the god Pythian Apollo purchasing one or more slaves from a slave owner. In reality, the slave
bought his or her own freedom and was only nominally the property of the deity.6 Accordingly,

4

Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 237;
Zelnick-Abramovitz, 5.
5
Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978): 133-134.
6
Kamen, “Sale for the Purpose of Freedom: Slave-Prostitutes and Manumission in Ancient Greece,” The Classical
Journal 109 (2014): 285.
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scholars often refer to these transactions as “fictive sales,”7 “trust sales,”8 or, more broadly,
“sacral manumission.”9 The inscription recording the manumission of a slave named Ladika is
fairly typical and can illustrate the standard form of this practice:
ἄρχοντος Ἐµµενίδα τοῦ Καλλία µηνὸς Δαιδαφορίου, ἀπέδοτο Τελεσὼ Μνασικράτεος
Δελφίς, συνευδοκέοντος καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ Κλέωνος, τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Πυθίωι σῶµα
γυναικε͂ιον ἇι ὄνοµα Λαδίκα τὸ γένος Σύραν, τιµᾶς ἀργυρίου µνᾶν τριῶν, καὶ τὰν τιµὰν
ἔχει, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Λαδίκα τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν, ἐφ’ ὧιτε ἐλευθέραν εἶµεν καὶ
ἀνέφαπτον ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα χρόνον, ποιέουσα ὅ κα θέληι καὶ ἀποτρέχουσα οἷς κα
θέληι. βεβαιωτὴρ κατὰ τὸν νόµον τᾶς πόλιος· Ἀστόξενος Διονυσίου. εἰ δέ τις ἐφάπτοιτο
Λαδίκας ἐπὶ καταδουλισµῶι, βέβαιον παρεχόντων τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνὰν ἅ τε ἀποδοµένα
Τελεσὼ καὶ ὁ βεβαιωτὴρ Ἀστόξενος· εἰ δὲ µὴ παρέχοιεν βέβαιον τὰν ὠνὰν τῶι θεῶι,
πράκτιµοι ἐόντων κατὰ τὸν νόµον. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες κύριοι ἐόντων
συλέοντες ὡς ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν ἀζάµιοι ἐόντες καὶ ἀνυπόδικοι πάσας δίκας καὶ ζαµίας
µάρτυρες· τοὶ ἱερεῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος Ταραντῖνος, Ἀµύντας καὶ τοὶ ἄρχοντες Ἀριστίων,
Ἄσανδρος, Ἀριστόµαχος, ἰδιῶται Πατρέας, Εὐκράτης, Ἀστόξενος, Κλέων, Ἀρτεµίδωρος,
Χαρίξενος.10
While Emmenidas son of Kallias was archon in the month of Daidaphorios, Teleso
daughter of Mnasikrates of Delphi, with her son Kleon also consenting, sold to Pythian
Apollo a female body named Ladika, Syrian in origin, for the price of three mnae of
silver, and [Teleso] holds the payment, accordingly as Ladika entrusted the sale to the
god, according to which she be free and untouchable by all for all time, doing whatever
she wishes and going wherever she wishes. The guarantor in accordance with the law of
the city: Astoxenos son of Dionysios. If anyone should lay hands on Ladika for
enslavement, let both the seller Teleso and the guarantor Astoxenos provide the sale as
secure to the god; if they should not provide the sale as secure to the god, let them be
fined in accordance with the law. Likewise also let bystanders have the power to protect
her as being free, themselves being unpunished and not liable to any judgment and
penalty. Witnesses: the priests of Apollo Tarantinos, Amuntas, and the magistrates
Aristion, Asandros, Aristomachos, and the private citizens Patreas, Eukrates, Astoxenos,
Kleon, Artemidoros, Charixenos.
The inscriptions, which are largely formulaic, begin much like other contractual
epigraphy: they date the sale by month and by specific annual magistracies, and introduce the
enumeration of conditions upon which the involved parties have agreed. Multiple slave owners
could play a direct hand in selling the slave, but occasionally other family members appear in the
7

Kamen, “Manumission and Slave Allowances in Athens,” Historia 65 (2016): 424.
Westermann, “Between Slavery and Freedom,” The American Historical Review 50 (1945): 215.
9
Kamen (2014), 285.
10
SGDI 1735.
8
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text as simply συνευδοκέοντος (“consenting”)—this addition, which Westermann labels the
“approval clause,” most likely protected the freedperson from potential contestations to his or her
freedom by the slave owner’s heirs in the future.11 These masters were most often from Delphi, a
smaller but still sizable portion were from central Greece, and some few others came from
farther locations like Athens or even Macedon.12
Next in the document after the name of the slave owner is the description of the sale,
detailing the amount of money the owner received from the divine buyer, Apollo—a sum that
really came from the slave, as indicated in the language of the epigraphy: ἐπίστευσε…τῶι θεῶι
τὰν ὠνάν (“he/she entrusted the sale to the god”). Despite this mention of action undertaken by
the slave, as an object traded in a transaction he or she is referred to simply as a gendered σῶµα
(“body”) with a name and occasionally with an origin (only about a fifth of the inscriptions
specify ethnicity).13 The inscriptions do, however, indicate that Apollo would not be exercising
his new rights of ownership, for a result of the sale is that the slave ἐλευθέρα εἶµεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτος
(“is free and untouchable”).
The manumission agreements often arranged for multiple layers of protection over this
new status of the manumitted slaves (which suggests, also, how plausible the dangers were to a
freedperson’s newfound freedom). One such measure was, as mentioned previously, the written
approval of the manumission by certain family members of the manumittor, so that they
renounced any future claim they might have been able to make on the freed slave. The contracts
also come with witnesses and guarantors, whom the inscriptions specifically name and who were
acting κατὰ τὸν νόµον τᾶς πόλιος (“in accordance with the law of the city”), suggesting that there

11

Westermann, “Extinction of Claims in Slave Sales at Delphi,” Journal of Juristic Papyrology 4 (1950): 58.
Hopkins, 138.
13
Hopkins, 139.
12
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was also a degree of security that the polis itself indirectly provided the manumitted slaves.14 A
mix of private citizens and officials, both sacred and secular, typically made up the witnesses,
and a number of manumission agreements include a penalty, usually monetary, against the seller
and guarantor should they not fulfill their duties in ensuring the security of the sale.15 This
obligation to pay a financial penalty to the god Apollo invested the interest of the guarantor and
the seller into the protection of the manumitted slave’s freedom and into upholding the terms of
the agreement. Many inscriptions also bestow onto any bystanders the power to defend the
freedperson’s freedom with impunity. This clause essentially provides a sense of protection over
the manumitted slave’s freedom in perpetuity, granting anyone permission—and indeed,
conferring a certain sense of responsibility—to come to the defense of a freedperson without any
fear of legal or criminal consequence (which was especially important in the event that the
manumittor or guarantor should die). Though not all of the inscriptions include all of these
provisions, a substantial proportion of them provide at least some security against anyone
challenging or threatening the freedom acquired through the manumission. Despite the
“fictitious” nature of the transactions in the manumission epigraphy, the legal provisions and
safeguards were entirely real.
Two thirds of the slaves named in the Delphic epigraphy did immediately receive the
powers ποιεῖν ὅ κα θέληι, εἶµεν εἷ κα θέληι (“to do whatever he/she wishes and to live wherever
he/she wishes”) with the accompanying protections from the moment of the payment.16
However, about a third of the manumission cases at Delphi include a clause that required the
slave to “remain” (παραµένειν) after the sale for a prescribed duration of time with the former

14

For the interest of the city in manumissions, see Zelnick-Abramovitz, “Freed slaves, Their Status and State
Control in Ancient Greece,” Revue Européenne d'Histoire 16 (2009): 303-318.
15
Kamen (2014), 288-289.
16
Hopkins, 140.
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owner or other individual—hence the name for a contract of this kind, paramone (παραµονή). A
typical paramone clause takes a form similar to that in a slave woman Philtate’s manumission:
παραµεινάτω δὲ Φιλτάτη Εὐκλέᾳ τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς χρόνον, πᾶν ποιοῦσα τὸ ἐπιτασόµενον
ἀνενκλήτως. εἰ δὲ µὴ ποιέοι, ἐξουσίαν ἐχέτω ἐπιτειµέουσα Εὔκλεα τρόπῳ ᾧ κα θέλῃ.17
Let Philtate remain beside Euklea as long as she lives, doing everything ordered
irreproachably. If she should not do so, let Euklea have the power to punish her in
whatever way she wishes.
Though following a recognizable formula, the paramone arrangements themselves involved
conditions of varying number and stringency. Generally, the paramone clause obligated the
manumitted person to stay in the service of the master or the master’s family, and usually until
the slave owner died (though some slave owners did set a specific number of years).18 Some
contracts offered the manumitted slave the option to pay additional sums to shorten the period of
continued service; there are indeed examples of such apolysis (“release”) inscriptions, which
discharged the manumitted slave early from the paramone term.19 The large number of contracts
involving paramone service suggests that manumission was often not a simple conversion in
status, but could instead be a complicated and drawn-out process.
The collection of manumission epigraphy in the sanctuary to Apollo at Delphi contains
these common features, which make the inscriptions similar to one another but which also make
the group as a whole distinctive. However, such standard and formulaic features do not come
close to illustrating the complexity and peculiarity of the Delphic fictive sales, which include
hundreds of individualized stories with unique characters, backgrounds, and results.

17

FD 3.3.300.
Hopkins, 142.
19
FD 3.3.398, 419; SGDI 2015, 1868.
18
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Motivations for Manumission
Despite this apparent ability to enter into a contract with commitments and benefits, the
slave was still originally the legal property of the slave owner, used as a tool in whatever way the
owner decided. So why were these slaves in the Delphic inscriptions able to purchase release
from enslavement? Selling the slave was fully in the slave owner’s right to do, and freeing the
slave deprived the owner’s heirs of part of their inheritance. Moreover, freed slaves were not
granted citizenship in Greece as in Rome, so there were none of the social or political benefits
that came along with accumulating loyal clients.20 So why did Greek slave masters offer the
option of freedom to their slaves, when they were under no obligation to do so?
For the unconditional and immediately effective manumissions, it seems likely that the
slave owner used manumission to replace an older slave with a younger one at minimal cost. In
other words, another slave owner would pay less money to purchase the older slave than would
the slave himself or herself. Hamel’s interpretation of the manumission of Neaira, a slaveprostitute in Athens, illustrates this opportunity. Neaira’s two male owners, when they wanted to
get married, offered her freedom for two-thirds of the price they paid to own her, a gesture which
Apollodoros (or Pseudo-Demosthenes) suggests is generosity as a result of affection for the
slave-girl.21 Hamel, however, disagrees. She points out the difficulty that the two men would
likely face in trying to sell a slave-girl of Neaira’s age, already older and “past her prime”—they
might not even have received as much as the sale-price they extended to girl herself, at least
without investing time (which they perhaps could not spare) into finding the right customers.
“They were certain of getting their price, and they were spared the trouble of haggling,” Hamel

20
21

Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 60.
Dem. 59. 30
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notes.22 Whatever the true intent of Neaira’s owners was, Hamel’s reasoning can easily apply to
the Delphic manumissions. Zelnick-Abramovitz even calls it the “most obvious reason,” namely
that the slave owners would want to rid themselves of an older and less sellable slave while at the
same time acquiring the money to buy a younger and more vigorous replacement.23 Still, this is
largely speculation, since there is no way to know the age of the manumitted slaves in the
inscriptions, but the manumission prices in the inscriptions did correlate closely with the marketprice of a new slave (the average price range being three to five mnae).24
Manumissions with paramone, however, could actually yield a profit for the slave owner,
even in excess of the manumitted slave’s original purchase price. In manumissions that obligated
the slave to a period of paramone, the slave owner received both the money for purchasing
another, younger slave, and also the continued service of the manumitted slave, often until the
slave owner’s death. A common provision for paramone was that, during its extent, the
manumitted slave ποιοῦντα πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτασσόµενον (“do everything that is ordered”), often
accompanied with ἀνεγκλήτως (“irreproachably”) or πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν (“in every way possible”).
Such conditions imply that the slaves in these documents were meant to keep working much as
they did as slaves, compelled to follow every order of the masters’ to the best of their abilities. If
the implication is not clear, some inscriptions are more explicit: in FD 3.3.337, three manumitted
slave-girls agree to δουλεύοντα (“be slaves”) during the term of paramone, which is until the
master dies. Similarly, in FD 3.6.51, Sotima and her son Polytimidas reserve the power, if the
manumitted slaves do not follow orders, to ἐπιτιµέοντες ὡς δούλοις (“punish them as/as if

22

Hamel, Trying Neaira: The True Story of A Courtesan’s Scandalous Life in Ancient Greece (New Haven &
London: Yale University Press, 2003).
23
Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 151.
24
Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 155; Hopkins, 159-160.
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slaves”). Such language raises the question: was the person who had paid for manumission, but
obligated to serve a paramone term, really still a slave?
To approach this question, it is necessary first to examine the conceptual framework
within which these manumission inscriptions were operating. The epigraphy presents a crucial
liminal moment in the lives of those sold to Pythian Apollo, capturing the transition between
slavery and freedom. The carved manumission contracts themselves not only effected this
transition, but also preserved it—in the future, the manumitted slave could point to the
inscription as evidence of his or her free status. The inscriptions therefore serve as a valuable
source for examining how the ancient Greeks conceived of and put into practice ideas of freedom
and personal liberty—what rights or qualities did those drawing up these contracts believe were
part of a free man’s status, and what distinguished a freed slave from an ordinary slave?
In the inscriptions, Westermann highlights four elements that appear often as markers of
freedom, distinguishing the freed slave from the pre-manumission slave:
1. He is to be his own representative, his own master, in all legal matters, without need
of intervention of a second party. This is the legal expression of freedom.
2. He is not subject to seizure as property. Said otherwise: No one dares lay a hand upon
him.
3. He may do what he desires to do.
4. He may go where he desires to go. Or, in a variant form, he may live where he desires
to live.25
Westermann is certainly correct that the Delphic sales often include these aspects of liberty to
expound the manumitted slave’s new freed status. That no one may seize the manumitted slave
as property is illustrated in the slave becoming ἀνέφαπτος (“untouchable”) through
manumission—this sense of the word is confirmed by the commonly added provisions that
anticipate the possibility that τις ἐφάπτοιτο…ἐπὶ καταδουλισσµῶι (“someone should lay hand on

25

Westermann, “Slavery and Elements of Freedom in Ancient Greece,” in Slavery in Classical Antiquity, ed. Moses
Finley (Cambridge: Heffer, 1968): 26.
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[the manumitted slave] for the purpose of enslavement”). The conferral of freedom of action
usually appears in the contracts as the manumitted slave ποιέουσα ὅ κα θέλη, and likewise the
freedom of movement as ἀποτρέχουσα οἷς κα θέλη.26 These various personal freedoms can
appear in any number or combination in the inscriptions, but all together they usually comprise
the most detailed descriptions of the shift from slave to freedperson.
For the nearly three quarters of the inscriptions which bestow immediate and
unadulterated freedom, there is not much that is vague in the manumitted slave’s status; he or she
is now a free person, free to do whatever, to go wherever, and to not be enslaved. However,
contracts that include paramone agreements have incited much debate and confusion in
scholarship regarding the question of servile status, particularly because in such cases the slave
continues serving the master after the time of the manumission contract. The convention is to
label the state of the person serving in paramone “conditional freedom” since the contract
attaches certain obligations to the enslaved party.27 This term, however, is ambiguous. When
they employ it, the scholars tend to treat it as a paradoxical state of freedom, whereby there are
conditions placed upon the activities of the freed person: Kamen describes those obligated to
paramone as “slaves freed with strings attached.”28 The confusion arising from this
understanding of “conditional freedom,” in conjunction with how harsh these “strings” were in
paramone, is reflected in its treatment in scholarship. Westermann asserts, “To the Greek mind,
freedom was not a unit but something divisible,”29 and explains that those bound to paramone
terms were legally free, but not necessarily free in respect to the other elements of freedom that
26

For examples in which all of these elements are included (often in the same sentence), see SGDI 1686, 1724,
1727,1728, 1733.
27
Kamen, Status in Classical Athens (Princeton: University Press, 2013), 34; Tucker, “Women in the Manumission
Inscriptions at Delphi,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 112 (1982): 226; Hopkins, 141;
Finley (1968), 55.
28
Kamen (2013), 30.
29
Westermann (1968), 27.
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he identified.30 In short, he affirms of the Greeks, “Theirs was a society in which a man could be
part free and part slave, ἡµίδουλος.”31 Similarly, Kamen describes conditionally freed slaves as
being “neither free nor slave, but in some ways both,”32 Zelnick-Abramovitz speaks of them as
occupying a position of “semi-slavery, or half way between slavery and freedom,”33 and
Sokolowski refers to “the half freedman in paramone.”34 Despite his many disagreements with
Westermann, Finley too observes the phenomenon that “a man who has been a slave is freed, but
his freedom is partly withdrawn in the same action in which it is given to him,”35 leaving the
man with only partial freedom; he puts the conditionally freed slave on the “spectrum of
statuses” between slave, freedman, and free citizen.36 Despite this apparent consensus, scholarly
opinion on the status of slaves during periods of paramone seems rather steeped in uncertainty,
settling only on an agreement on the ambiguity of the status.
The general assumption, then, appears to be that the master freed the slave upon the sale
recorded in the manumission inscriptions, and that the manumitted slave performed the
paramone as a freedperson—thus the slave’s precarious state of liberation. Westermann says as
much explicitly: “paramone was not just a deferral of manumission, but rather a new status for
the slave as a freedman with certain obligations and duties.”37 As mentioned above, scholars
therefore usually treat the “conditional” part of “conditional freedom” as shaping the life of the
freedman or freedwoman following liberation, as conditions under which the freedperson could
be free (at least until the owner dies). However, conditions of this kind exist in the inscriptions
outside of paramone clauses, and these are typically not included in the category of “conditional
30

Westermann, 28-29.
Ibid. Westermann invents this term—it does not appear anywhere in the epigraphy.
32
Kamen (2013), 37.
33
Zelnick-Abramovitz, (2005), 339.
34
Sokolowski, “The Real Meaning of Sacral Manumission,” The Harvard Theological Review 47 (1954): 174.
35
Finley, “Servile Statuses of Ancient Greece,” Revue Internationale des Droits de L'antiquité 7 (1954): 182.
36
Finley, (1968): 55.
37
Westermann, “Paramone as a General Service Contract,” Journal of Juristic Papyrology 2 (1948): 16.
31
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freedom” (which usually exclusively refers to paramone cases). For example, in SGDI 1718,
Epicharidas prohibits the manumitted slave Asia from living outside Lileia (where he resides),
and in FD 3.3.26, Lais’ manumittors dictate that she cannot “speak badly” of them.38 In neither
of these cases are the manumitted slaves obligated to paramone, and in both these cases the
manumittors lay out the conditions that are specific to their transaction. In just the sheer number
of paramone contracts (four hundred),39 Westermann therefore seems correct in arguing that
paramone prescribed a distinct status for the slave that could be encapsulated in the recognizable
and much-used term παραµεινάτω (“let him/her remain beside”). However, when contrasted with
these more straightforward examples of rule-based freedom, could the sense of “conditional
freedom” in the case of paramone be instead that there were conditions upon the completion of
which the freedperson was manumitted? In other words, was the agreement of paramone instead
that the slave would acquire freedom after fulfilling the conditions?
It is worthwhile to examine to what extent the elements of freedom identified by
Westermann are applicable to the situation of the person under paramone obligations. In terms of
the virtually always-present statement that the slave in the manumission contract ἐλευθέρα εἶµεν,
Sosin points out that the infinitive “to be” in the Delphic inscriptions “referred to something that
‘is to’ come about,” a “prospective, future sense of the infinitive” that appears in many legal
contexts.40 As an example, he calls attention to the language of a contract for a fourth century
lease, which indicates that a number of individuals κατὰ τάδε ἐµίσθωσαν (“let [several buildings]
on the following conditions”), ἐφ’ ὧιτε διδόναι (“according to which [the lessee] pay”) the rent
in two installments.41 The present infinitive “to be” in the Delphic inscriptions almost always
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follows ἐφ’ ὧιτε just as διδόναι does here, and just as διδόναι is a present infinitive indicating
future action, so too could be the role of εἶµεν in the manumission contracts. It is not, Sosin
asserts, “effecting, or even recognizing existing liberty,” as many scholars often misconstrue it to
do.42 There are even some inscriptions that make clear that the manumission follows the
completion of paramone service: for example, SGDI 1703 dictates, εἴ κα παραµείνη, καθὼς
γέγραπται, βέβαιος ἔσ[τ]ω ἁ ὠνὰ τῶι θεῶι (“if [the slave] remains beside, accordingly as has
been written, let the sale be guaranteed to the god”).43 It is impossible to know whether these
cases are special or simply articulate what is implicit in most. If, however, Sosin is correct and
the act of manumission does not necessarily occur at the moment of the monetary transaction,
there is little to suggest that the people serving under paramone have any share of freedom yet.
The description of the freedperson’s status as ἀνέφαπτος best illustrates the contradictions
within the Delphic sales if the slave in paramone is, in fact, free, as many scholars take for
granted. Considering one sense of “untouchable” being “not subject to enslavement”, there are
multiple examples of inscriptions that allow the manumittor to render the contract void and
thereby return the “manumitted” slave to slavery before the completion of the paramone term
(usually as a result of the slave not satisfactorily performing the services in paramone).44 In these
cases, the “manumitted” individual could easily fall right back into enslavement—there is little
authority or protection in his new status. Furthermore, being “untouchable” could also refer to
the use of physical force that was characteristic of slavery. Demosthenes comments:
If, gentlemen of the jury, you will turn over in your minds the question what is the
difference between being a slave and being a free man, you will find that the biggest
difference is that the body of a slave is made responsible for all his misdeeds, whereas
corporal punishment is the last penalty to inflict on a free man.45
42
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Slaves could, and often did, suffer physical and violent punishment at the hands of their masters,
something that distinguished them from free men and which Demosthenes even considers as
being a defining quality of slavery. Certainly those serving paramone terms were subject to
physical punishment at the will of the slave owner; frequently the master was allowed ἐπιτειµέων
τρόπῳ ᾧ κα θέλῃ (“to punish [the slave] in whatever way he/she wishes”) if the slave did not
perform as promised or desired.46 This is despite the fact that, in many cases, the same
inscriptions say that the slave is to be free and untouchable ἀπὸ πάντων τὸν πάντα βίον (“by all
for the rest of his/her life”) or sometimes τὸν πάντα χρόνον (“for all time”).47 It seems like quite a
contradiction for a contract to protect the freed slave from physical harm or re-enslavement by
anyone for the rest of his or her life (such privileges as come with freedom), and a few lines later
to bestow unto the slave owner the power to physically harm or re-enslave this same freedperson.
This apparent inconsistency can be reconciled if the slave is not actually manumitted until after
the period of paramone.
Returning back to the sometimes explicit obligation of slaves in these contracts to serve
their masters δουλεύοντες (“being slaves”) and so on,48 such language eliminates the last two
elements of freedom outlined by Westermann: the ability to do or go wherever one wishes, or
freedom of action and of movement respectively. The person in paramone certainly cannot go
wherever he or she pleases, since he or she needs to be near the slave owner in order to execute
πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτασσόµενον ἀνεγκλήτως or πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν—and this of course means the same person
does not have the freedom to do whatever he or she pleases either (especially with the threat of
violent punishment or nullification of the contract). If, then, the only qualities distinguishing a
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slave from a freed slave are these elements of freedom illustrated in the Delphic sales themselves
and enumerated by Westermann (for most freed slaves most likely did not receive citizenship),49
and the slaves under paramone evidently enjoyed none of these personal freedoms, then were
they not just still slaves?
It appears likely that those who were conditionally manumitted (however one may define
it) were what Kamen calls “privileged slaves,” who had more autonomy than the average chattel
slave over their movement and who had the potential to make money.50 By this definition, they
would have been privileged even before the composition of the manumission contract, but the
inscribed legal promise of future manumission surely heightened this privilege. It may be more
accurate, then, to consider the inscriptions including paramone clauses as being “pre-contracts,”
written commitments to a legally clear process that will result in the slaves’ freedom, but not
grant it immediately. Yet even if scholarly consensus is correct about a free-servile gray area
created by paramone agreements, nonetheless it is worth noting that the “freed” slaves under
paramone resembled average slaves a great deal, and that the dynamic between manumitted and
manumittor during paramone periods resembled the previous and more straightforward slavemaster relationship a great deal. Therefore, in sum, from paramone agreements, manumittors
benefitted by obtaining the monetary sums to replace a slave who essentially still continued his
or her servile labor in the same manner as before.
There were other ways the slave owner could benefit from the manumissions with
paramone attached. If a slave wanted early release from the agreed term of extended service,
often he or she would pay an additional sum for apolysis, which was no small fraction of the
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original manumission cost.51 Moreover, there are multiple examples of contracts that stipulate
that the property of a freed slave, upon his or her death, go to the manumittor or the
manumittor’s family.52 Such inheritances could have been a way to make up for the assets lost by
the manumittor’s heirs as a result of the manumission; whatever the financial loss involved in the
relinquishment of a slave, it was reabsorbed when the yields of his or her labor in freedom
returned back into the manumittor’s family. The slave owner demanding paramone could
therefore make money both directly from the price of manumission (with no loss in labor for, in
most cases, the rest of the owner’s life) and from other payments after the inscribing of the
manumission contract.
The assumption is, of course, that the sums passing between the hands of the slave and
the master were compensatory for the monetary loss of the slave’s service and meant to go
toward the acquisition of a new slave. One example illustrates this mna-to-person relationship: in
SGDI 1717, Aphrodisia agrees to remain with her manumittors until they die, and thereupon to
buy her freedom from their son for one mna. However, she can achieve early release from her
paramone by purchasing a female slave (of the same age) who would take her place. Tucker
indicates a particularly interesting element of this agreement: should she attain her apolysis, upon
the death of her manumittors Aphrodisia has to give their son either the aforementioned one mna,
or the female slave who served in her stead.53 The new female slave would therefore still belong
to Aphrodisia during the paramone term, and would quite literally be standing in for Aphrodisia
and serving the term for her.
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Such arrangements cast even more skepticism over the status of a manumitted slave’s
“freedom” under paramone. Aphrodisia could purchase a slave, but for a number of women,
even the human life they created while “remaining beside” their former masters did not belong to
them. These cases provide an especially disheartening view into the dehumanizing business of
slavery, whereby slave owners used the reproductive potential of female slaves to capitalize on
manumission. At least thirteen of the inscriptions require slave-women in paramone to supply
one or more children for enslavement to the manumittor’s family, usually to his children.54
Occasionally, owners also retained the right to keep children born from a woman in paramone as
slaves or to sell them as they wish. As an example, in FD 3.6.39, Aristion and Eisias state that
children born to Sostrata during her time in paramone would be free, ἐκτὸς ἐὰν µή τι θέλωντι
Ἀριστίων καὶ Εἰσιὰς πωλῆσαι πρὸς ἔνδειαν (“except if Aristion and Eisias wish to sell them in the
face of need”).55 Most commonly, though, the arrangement entailed the female slave paying the
price of manumission, serving her master until his or her death, and giving a baby or babies to
the manumittor’s heir. For her manumission, Sotericha (FD 3.3.273) pays the initial
manumission fee, submits to a term of paramone in the service of her manumittors, agrees to
provide children for her manumittors, and is given an additional price to pay for apolysis if she
wants to be released early.56 These instances are particularly disturbing illustrations of how far
the objectification of these slaves, and slave children, could go on both sides of the transaction—
and how slavery could rend families apart. “Parents left children behind in slavery to win
freedom for themselves as adults,” observes Hopkins.57 Through conditional manumission, slave
owners could get multiple slaves out of a single slave; whether by the mnae the freed slave gave
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or by the slave’s own flesh and blood—or in many cases both—the manumission of one slave
could more than make up for itself with respect to the master’s slave supply.
Not even should apparent parentage in the inscriptions necessarily suggest fondness or
kindness as primary motivations for the manumittors. Some manumittors could indeed have been
the fathers of the slave children mentioned, and some inscriptions suggest this relationship more
than others. One such case is that of Agamestor, son of Telestas; he manumitted Zopyra and her
two children, σώµατα ἀνδρεῖα δύο οἷς ὀνόµατα Ἀγαµήστωρ, Τελέστας, τὸ γένος οἰκογενεῖς (“two
male bodies named Agamestor [and] Telestas, home-born in origin”).58 In addition to her
children—both born in the home—sharing the names of the slave owner and of his father,
Zopyra and her sons were to remain with Agamestor for the rest of his life. These pieces together
make the parties in this inscription look like something of a family unit. In another similar case,
Kleomantis manumits Eisias in standard fashion, committing her to paramone and even
clarifying his power to punish her however he wishes should she not hold up her end of the
agreement.59 However, Eisias’ apolysis appears later in FD 3.3.333, as well as that of τὸν
γεγενηµένον ἐν τᾷ παραµονᾷ ἐξ αὐτᾶς υἱὸν Νικόστρατον, ὃν καὶ µετωνόµασα θέσει Κλεόµαντιν
(“her son Nikostratos born from her in paramone, whom also [Kleomantis] has changed the
name to Kleomantis”). Kleomantis then names Eisias and her son as his heirs, after his wife.
Between the written manumission of Eisias and her apolysis, she may have borne a child by
Kleomantis, as illustrated in her new inheritance and in the change of her son’s name.60
However, seeing as Eisias and her son become his beneficiaries, it seems probable that
Kleomantis has no other offspring to whom he can pass on his legacy. The biological truth of
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nominally paternal inscriptions like these61 is difficult to ascertain, but both the cases of
Agamestor and Kleomantis demonstrate how a slave owner—presumably one without free or
“legitimate” offspring—could turn to manumission in order to secure his family name and
property, or perhaps to ensure the arrangement of his funeral rites, as a number of inscriptions
also require of the manumitted slave.62
It appears best, in general, to avoid assuming that these manumittors offered freedom to
their slaves purely out of generosity or affection. There could always be the exceptional cases,
but financially slave owners stood to gain a great deal from offering their slaves the prospective
of freedom, especially through a paramone arrangement. Hopkins points out the irony that lies at
the heart of this kind of manumission. “The legal force of contract was being used to get exslaves to agree to their own exploitation,”63 he remarks, then continues later: “Manumission and
the slave market grew hand in hand.”64 The types of manumission arrangements preserved in the
Delphic epigraphy made the slave complicit in the slave system; the money one slave paid to
grasp freedom went toward the continued enslavement of another. This cycle is all the more
apparent when the slaves and slave owners use human lives as bargaining chips in these
manumission transactions.

Purchasing Manumission
One of the most fundamental aspects of Delphic manumission was the payment of money
by the slave to the slave owner.65 In the whole collection of inscriptions, there are only two cases
in which the manumittors give freedom (though with paramone) to slaves δωρέαν (“as a gift”)—
61
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in other words, free of charge.66 But how did slaves, a group of people who by definition did not
perform labor for compensation, and especially in a society where slaves had, in theory, no legal
rights over property,67 possibly raise this money with which they could purchase their freedom?
And why would masters allow their slaves to keep this money at all, when they could claim all of
it for themselves?
Regarding the specific occupations that provided the slaves in the Delphic inscriptions
the means to save up the cost of manumission, the epigraphy does not offer much information. In
the whole collection, a tiny number (less than a dozen) of the inscriptions include the specific
trade of the slave, and even then the texts can be vague,68 such as when the slave women are
simply referred to as τέχνιτις (“skilled woman”, or “craftswoman”).69 There are, however, two
inscriptions that include flute-playing slaves,70 and two that include seamstresses. 71 In FD
3.1.565—the only inscription that names a male slave’s craft—the manumitted man is a bronze
worker (τεχνείταν χαλκῆ).72 But the small size of this sample, of course, does not mean that the
slaves who are not explicitly associated with a skill were unskilled. Tucker guesses that
inscriptions may have included the slave’s occupation as an explanation for a particularly high
manumission price,73 but the seamstresses in FD 3.2.230 and 3.3.26 purchased their freedom for
five mnae and four mnae, 30 staters respectively, a perfectly average cost for manumission in the
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Delphic data. Likewise, within this small sample of inscriptions, the race or origin of the slave
seems to have little correlation with the slave’s occupation.74 All in all, there seems to be little
significance in whether or not a manumission inscription included the particular kind of work in
which the manumitted slave was engaged. Just as with the mention of the slave’s birth, the
mention of the occupation was likely a discretionary addition to the manumission contract for a
more detailed identification of the manumitted slave, perhaps if the slave planned on continuing
in this occupation in his or her freedom. Surely the more explicit the description of the
manumitted slave was, the better the inscription served as evidence in the event that the
freedperson had to prove his or her free status (and the slave owner may simply not have wanted
to pay to inscribe anything that was not imperative to include).75
The Delphic inscriptions themselves therefore do not supply much material for
understanding the range of jobs in which the manumitted slaves were previously employed. This
relative silence presents a conundrum of a clear possession of money by the slaves manumitted
in Delphi (for that it was they who paid the manumission price instead of, ostensibly, the god
Apollo, the overwhelming majority of the inscriptions communicate with the statement that the
slave “entrusted the sale to the god”) and little to no evidence from the epigraphy or Delphi as to
how they possibly acquired these sums. Most evidence of slaves’ accumulation of money comes
from Athens, particularly because of the city’s judicial system and the court speeches that have
survived. The extent to which Attic evidence can speak to Delphic practice is, of course, limited
and can only be speculative, but it provides some mode of addressing this conundrum—and
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especially because there are indications that a paramone-like procedure existed in Athens,76 there
is reason to suppose that the two regions had similarities in their slave systems.
The means by which a slave could receive and save up money seems chiefly to be found
in the multiple mentions of an ἀποφορά (“apophora”), a payment that slaves regularly made to
their masters.77 Aeschines in Against Timarchus provides the most detail about the nature of
these payments: he says that Timarchus had “nine or ten slaves who were skilled shoemakers,
each of whom paid him a fee (ἀποφορὰν ἔφερε) of two obols a day.”78 The term itself lends some
information: the prefix ἀπο suggests that money came “from” the slave, meaning that the slave
possessed some means from which he or she could pay the sum79 (Kazakévich illustrates the
clear distinction between a slave supplying an apophora and a slave who was µισθοφορῶν,
“misthos-bearing” or “rent-bearing,” who handed over to the slave owner the money which a
third party provided for the slave’s services).80 Excluding, then, the pay from hired-out service to
another individual, a likely source of this apophora money was profit derived from the
manufacturing and sale of goods. These skilled slaves sometimes received a “slave-allowance,”81
a fraction of their earnings which they were allowed to keep: the Old Oligarch confirms that the
apophora which such slaves gave to their owners was only a portion of what they earned in their
work.82 Especially if, as in Timarchus’ case, the monetary obligation of these slaves to their
owners was a fixed price, Kamen logically assumes that the slaves were typically permitted to
keep whatever earnings remained after the apophora and use them as they wished83—including
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saving them up to buy freedom. Acton concurs, and remarks “being able to keep profits after the
apophora was best of all, especially as it offered the prospect of manumission,”84 and Kamen
adds that slaves who had this chance at purchasing freedom were distinctly “privileged” relative
to the largely wage-less slave population.85
Kamen also calculates the kind of time frame that saving up for manumission could
entail: using the shoemaking slaves of Timarchus as an example, she concludes that, with a
savings rate of one obol a day, it would have taken at least five to eight years for a slave to raise
the money for manumission.86 Even if saving one obol a day is perhaps unrealistic, this is not a
particularly long amount of time—for example, if a young slave girl started working and saving
in her early adolescence, she could theoretically buy her freedom in her early adulthood (which
may perhaps help explain the multiple Delphic manumission contracts which require, and
therefore assume feasible, that manumitted women bear children for the manumittors). However,
how the practice of apophora worked is still obscure in the details, for although Timarchus’
system appears to be a fixed price paid daily, other examples indicate that longer distances
sometimes existed between slave and slave master which would have made daily payments
unlikely. Each arrangement probably differed from case to case, as probably did the rate a slave
saved up money.87
Many scholars assume that the apophora came from slaves who were “living apart” from
their masters, running factories or workshops outside the master’s home on the master’s behalf.88
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There were indeed slaves who conducted businesses in a semiautonomous manner at a distance
from their masters,89 and there were a number of advantages for the slave owner who granted
this kind of independence to a slave. By having slaves work in (as well as, often, manage)90 these
satellite businesses, the slave owner essentially made a low-risk, low-maintenance investment
that yielded steady profits. The slave owners could leave much of the business management to
the slaves and simply reap the benefits of his or her slaves’ industry. Though with a fixed
apophora the slave could consequently lose money when the business suffered, he or she also
stood to make a great deal of money when it succeeded. “The risk and the profit of the business
belonged to the foreman,” Acton observes.91 The slaves worried about the daily operation of the
business, and they provided the owner a constant stream of money.
However, these slaves working outside their master’s households cannot account entirely
for the large quantity of slaves in the Delphic epigraphy. For one thing, the majority of the slaves
in the inscriptions are female.92 Though there are examples of women working in or even
running separate businesses and workshops, 93 the overall relegation of women in Greece to the
household usually set the female slaves over domestic services. Therefore, if the slave owner
were to set up satellite businesses, he or she would probably not send out the female slaves to run
them. Furthermore, seeing as there are hundreds of slaves whose manumissions are recorded in
the inscriptions, this would be an astounding number of privately owned slaves to work outside
the home. Hopkins additionally deduces from the Delphic manumission data that the masters
generally did not own large numbers of slaves,94 and so they would probably not have invested
89
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their limited slave labor into enterprises not directly linked with the running of their household. It
seems more likely, therefore, that a large proportion of the slaves in the manumission
inscriptions worked within the owner’s οἶκος, and that “privileged” slave status was not limited
to those who worked outside the owner’s supervision.
How did slaves earn money for manumission—as those who ran separate businesses
could do—from the οἶκος? Certain archaeological investigations suggest that some households in
ancient Greece had workshops incorporated into them, even manufacturing on a large scale.
Cahill comes to this conclusion in his discussion of the site of Olynthus and the wealth of
archaeological evidence on Greek households that it contains.95 From his examination of this
excavated city and its homes, Cahill makes the following determinations: first, that household
industry—by which he means “the production or processing of goods for sale or consumption
outside the household” rather than production geared just toward the needs of the household
itself96—was not at all uncommon. Second, that the industry was not “geographically marginal”:
the houses that engaged in this kind of production were centrally located within the city and well
dispersed throughout it. Lastly, household industry was not even marginal within the house itself,
but rather it was “closely integrated with other household activities” and located in the heart of
the οἶκος, off the courtyard and adjoining rooms, and sometimes opening out onto the street (and
so giving the appearance of a shop). After noting that the homeowners could easily have
sequestered the workshops from the rest of the household activity, Cahill concludes, “the degree
of integration of domestic industry into the rest of the household is striking.”97 Ault comes to the
same conclusions, saying that the Greek household was oriented “towards market exchange” and
95
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“not merely subsistence, but surplus production.”98 Included among the archaeologically attested
types of work within the household are large-scale weaving, stonemasonry, sculpting, cobbling,
metalwork, and baking.99
Cahill and Ault both regard this evidence as at odds with the general disdain toward
banausic, technical work conveyed in the ancient sources,100 signaling a divide between ideology
and reality—Greeks may have looked down on craftsmanship and commerce in principle, but
they still engaged in them and reaped their rewards. The presence and centrality of such
production within Greek households does suggest that the condemnation of artisan activities was
probably stronger in speech than in practice, and perhaps was an attitude primarily belonging to
the elite. However, a passage from Xenophon’s Memorabilia may reconcile this seeming
inconsistency: when Aristarchus laments to Socrates that he cannot afford to feed all the people
in his house now that a number of female relatives have moved in, Socrates asks why another
man, Ceramon, is able to feed the same number of mouths while also making a profit.
Aristarchus responds, “The explanation, of course, is this: my dependents are gentlefolk, his are
slaves.” When Socrates suggests he put the free members of his household to work, Aristarchus
continues to insist that although his female relatives know how to do tasks like weaving and
baking, such jobs are unsuitable for free women.101 As with many of the arguments presented by
Socrates’ interlocutors, Aristarchus’ reasoning represents a generally held assumption, in this
case that household industry, like the production of textiles and food, is the job of slaves, and
only in times of exceptional need did the free participate in it (even this latter condition is a
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concession Socrates has to force from Aristarchus). Here, then, is a likely source of the
manumission payment for those slaves who lived within the owner’s home. Whether in a
household workshop of larger scale or simply through a surplus of goods that were part of the
ordinary production of the οἶκος, both male and female skilled slaves could have the opportunity
to manufacture goods for sale and generate income.102 The apophora system, and the potential
for monetary gain that it offered slaves, was thus not restricted to those who worked outside the
home.
A slave “privileged” by Kamen’s definition could therefore still live within the slave
owner’s domicile, and probably did more often than not. The skilled slave in the home would not
have the greater degree of freedom and autonomy that slaves further away enjoyed, but there
were many other aspects of his or her position that contributed to a relatively privileged status.
For one thing, skilled slaves making products for the household could stand to make money by
creating a surplus of their product for outside sale, especially if their skill was unique and refined
enough that their goods and, consequently, the slaves themselves became special (though,
admittedly, this could raise the manumission price proportionally to the slave’s perceived
value—some slaves explicitly regarded as “skilled” in the inscriptions had to pay as much as
eleven or fifteen mnae).103 An agricultural slave’s production of surplus product probably did not
so directly contribute to profits that the slave would derive wages from them, and there was
perhaps also less room for distinction in agricultural labor. Furthermore, the centrality of
workshops and other places of production within the home, and their integration with the other
household activities (which Cahill so thoroughly emphasized), would make it more possible for
slaves to interact with their owners’ families and forge familiar, and even close, relationships
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with them. Though the nearly always-present payment by the slave for manumission suggests
that affection between slave and master was not usually sufficient to result in the slave’s
liberation, fondness for the slave could certainly have led the master to lower the manumission
price, not require a paramone term, impose lighter contractual obligations, or even just be open
to the slave purchasing his or her freedom. In light of these advantages, it is not surprising that
not one of the occupations specified in the manumission inscriptions refers to agricultural work,
and it would probably not be erroneous to assume that the larger proportion of the slaves in the
Delphic manumission epigraphy were skilled, and not agrarian, workers.
Still, such benefits for the skilled slaves were a result of, and secondary to, the benefits
that such slave-driven household industry offered the slave owners. The profitable advantages of
production within the home were similar to those of the distant slave-run workshops, except in
the former case the slave owners could maintain supervision and tighter control over the slave
workers. Furthermore, by incentivizing the slaves to increase their productive output with the
promise of a piece of the sale earnings and, consequently, manumission, the slave owners were
“exploiting their domestic activities for profit,” as Brock puts it.104 Production of textiles, food,
and other staples was necessary to the functioning and self-sufficiency of the οἶκος, and so
people (usually slaves) would be engaged in the creation of these household goods anyway. The
apophora system could enable the slave owners to effectively extend their normal productive
domestic activity into the commercial sphere, to actually—as Socrates mentions Ceramon doing
in Xenophon’s Memorabilia—make a profit while performing the ordinary maintenance of his or
her οἶκος. At once the needs of the slave owner’s family and dependents were being provided for
and the slave owner was generating income.
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Presumably a sizable percentage of the money that the slave owner allowed the skilled
slave to keep ended up in the slave owner’s own pocket when the slave handed over his or her
savings for manumission. So, however positive an outlook one might take on the masters
bestowing onto their slaves higher degrees of autonomy and the means toward attaining
freedom—this “privileged” (a term which must always be considered relative to the situations of
other Greek slaves) status—they probably granted such privileges for self-serving purposes. In
addition to fostering good will and trust between slave and master (and therefore ensuring the
cooperation of the slave, to a certain degree), the slave owner also was able to guarantee revenue.
He or she could profit twice, once on a daily basis from the slave’s income generating labor, and
then again upon the slave’s manumission. Manumission in some sense was the element driving
this boosted exploitation forward. It provided the incentive for the slaves’ participation, while
also supplying a way for the system to replenish itself with younger slaves and so to continue as
an almost self-sustaining organism.

From Property to Personhood
Another of the most characteristic elements of Delphic manumission is the recorded
purchase of slaves by the god Apollo, typically κατὰ τοὺς νόµους τᾶς πόλιος (“in accordance with
the laws of the city”). The coexistence of legal procedure and religion is nothing extraordinary in
ancient Greece, where there was no distinct separation between “church” and “state”105: for
example, oaths to the gods could be used in legally binding agreements, and state assemblies
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regularly passed decrees regarding acts of impiety and temple operation.106 In these Delphic
inscriptions, however, the god is not invoked simply as a guarantor or witness of a legal
procedure—Apollo plays an active role in the slave’s manumission. This practice is typically
referred to as “sacral manumission,” whereby one or more divinities are involved in the
liberation of a slave (as opposed to the absence of gods in “secular manumission”). Delphi
presents the largest body of evidence for sacral manumission, and the act of fictive sale to a god
may have even originated there.107 But what was the purpose of framing manumission in this
way? Why is the god Apollo present at all in these inscriptions, and how did selling a slave to the
god translate into making that slave “free”?
In an effort to make sense of sacral fictive sale, some scholars have sought its origins in
actual practice, trying to establish a historical basis from which it evolved. They have invoked
temple slavery, the act of seeking asylum in temples, and genuine consecration of humans to
gods as possible ancestors of sacral manumission.108 However, none of these ideas have gained
widespread acceptance.109 Taking a different approach, Patterson has rightfully observed that
“when the authority of the state was strong (as in Athens, Corinth, and Thebes) there was no
need for, and no surviving evidence of, sacral manumission.”110 In other words, the presence of
the god could have served some legitimizing role in the manumission, providing a divine
sanction to the transaction (the real transaction between slave and owner) in places where a state
sanction was not as possible or authoritative. Yet this does not satisfactorily explain the role of
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the god as an actual party in the transaction—simply an invocation of Apollo as a witness could
have achieved similar ends.
Instead of in historical or practical origins, the answer may lie in the ideological leap that
the manumission of slaves demanded of Greek citizens. Freeing a slave necessarily involved the
conferral of personhood onto that which had previously been regarded as property. The
designation of the slaves as σώµατα (“bodies”) in the Delphic manumission inscriptions is itself
indicative of the degree to which the Greeks objectified their slaves. There was a long tradition
of free Greeks defining themselves in opposition to slaves, especially because of the association
they maintained between “barbarism” and slavery (as many slaves were of foreign extraction).
As a result, much of the “othering” that the Greeks employed in respect to foreign peoples,
whether through the reasoning of environmental determinism or criticism of foreign political
systems, applied to slaves in Greece as well.111 Weighted with all these negative ethnic
stereotypes in addition to the disdainful qualities of servitude itself, the slave was the ideological
antithesis to the free Greek citizen. It is therefore not surprising that slavery often served as the
substance of ad hominem attacks in Athenian courts. One especially aggressive example is the
invective Apollodoros employs in his speeches against his stepfather, a freedman named
Phormion. Apollodoros calls Phormion a slave (δοῦλος) no fewer than five times,112 says that he
is “base and unjust, and has been from the beginning, since [he left] the Anakeion”113—where
often slave sales took place—and entreats the jurors:
If only each of you might consider what domestic slave he left at home and imagine that
you have suffered from him the same things that we have suffered from this man [i.e.
Phormion]. Do not consider that each of them is Syros or Manes or something else, while
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this man is Phormion. The matter is the same: they are slaves, and he was a slave; you are
masters, and I was a master.114
Besides the obvious negative connotations that his references to servitude are meant to evoke,
Apollodoros is also appealing to an “us versus them” mentality toward slaves that is likely
already well established among the citizen jurors—his expectation of this is evident in the sheer
number of mentions he gives to Phormion’s former life as a δοῦλος. However, Apollodoros’
insults toward his stepfather also illustrate that this is not simply a distinction in status; after all,
Phormion is technically free now, and so he is in fact “something else” from Syros or Manes.
Apollodoros’ comments are not meant to literally challenge whether Phormion is legally free.
Rather, he means for them to paint Phormion’s character negatively, more specifically, as slavelike. Slavery is not simply a socioeconomic or legal position, but a quality inherent in one’s very
being. This is likely a general assumption upon which Apollodoros and many other orators115
relied when constructing their slave-referencing attacks in court. The servile invective, as well as
its purpose and intended effect on the jurors, says a great deal about the common attitude of the
Greek citizens toward the slaves they owned.
There were many negative qualities that the Greeks attributed to the slave’s inherent
nature, and which were typically diametrically opposed to their own. Slaves in comedy and
oratory often appear as prone to such vices as drunkenness, laziness, intemperance, dishonesty,
and stupidity, and as otherwise generally untrustworthy.116 There was also, noted previously, the
scorn of the elite, most often articulated by philosophers like Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon,
toward craftsmanship (an occupation of many slaves) and the mental and physical weakness it
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produced.117 “The focus was not so much on whether slavery as an institution was justifiable but
on what terms,” Wrenhaven observes.118 Naturally, the enslavement of another human being was
easier to rationalize the larger the distance was between master and slave, especially if the slave
embodied particularly negative traits and was essentially dehumanized. Of course, no discussion
of the reduction of slaves to nonhuman status is complete without consideration of Aristotle’s
notorious “natural slave” theory that he presents in the Politics.
It is worthwhile to consider how these manumissions fit within Aristotle’s theory for a
few reasons: first, as Finley notes of Aristotle, “he produced not only the first but also the last
formal, systematic analysis of the subject [of slavery] in antiquity, as far as we know.”119
Additionally, Schlaifer says that it is “the most commonly held of all the later theories” on
slavery,120 although truthfully it is difficult to know the mindset and attitudes of the general
population in antiquity. Most significantly in respect to the Delphic manumission epigraphy, his
theory poses the greatest ideological challenge to the notion that a slave should or can be free.
Aristotle treats slaves as, by their very nature, different from free men. At times he
equates them with animals, calling an ox “the poor man’s slave,”121 affirming hunting to be a
necessary skill for use against wild animals and uncooperative slaves,122 and commenting,
“indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different.”123 His reasoning lies
in the fundamental differences in the composition of the soul; whereas reason dominates the soul
in (free) men, and animals by contrast “obey their instincts” and cannot grasp reason,124 a slave
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“participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle,” he
says.125 In other words, while slaves have a share in rationality their version of it is somehow
deficient, rendering them distinct from those people who are by nature “free”.
This particular constitution that Aristotle ascribes to slaves is what renders them a natural
“living tool”, as he describes them.126 For “it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and
of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the
equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful,” he declares127—in other words,
the person who is born with this deficient form of rationality is at a disadvantage which renders
the person a lesser form of what he or she could be. Mastery by those who have full faculties of
intellect and rationality (in other words, those “free” by nature) corrects such shortcomings in the
soul, putting to use the little capacity that the slave has (too little to allow for a meaningful and
independent existence) in his service. “The master need only know how to order that which the
slave must know how to execute,” Aristotle says, and this allows the masters to devote their
abilities to philosophy or politics while the slaves devote theirs to servile work.128 Just as the
slave makes inanimate tools, like the shuttle or lyre, useful by putting them to action (for these
instruments cannot perform their functions on their own),129 so too the master makes the slave
useful by enslaving him or her and harnessing the slave’s capabilities—to the master’s benefit.
The slave-master relationship therefore, by Aristotle’s logic, allows both parties the chance to
realize their potential.

125

Ibid.
“ἔµψυχον ὄργανον” Arist. NE 1161b.
127
Arist. Pol. 1254b.
128
Arist. Pol. 1255b.
129
Arist. Pol. 1253b.
126

May 2018, Final paper submitted for Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
Claudia Kassner, College of Arts and Sciences 2018, University of Pennsylvania

34

35
Aristotle in this way consistently strains to paint slavery as something “expedient and
right”130 by virtue of the inherent predisposition to enslavement possessed by what here appears
as the “natural slave.” In furthering this aim, he tries to demonstrate that the master-slave
relationship is something that is mutually beneficial. It is through this reasoning of his that
manumission can perhaps fit into the natural slave theory. One analogy Aristotle employs in his
discussion is that of the whole and the part—the slave being the part, the master the whole.131
Just as a part functions in the service of the whole, the slave functions in the service of the
master: “for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an
equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no
better than that.”132 While this statement reiterates the uselessness of a slave without slavery, like
a hand without a body, it also emphasizes the “common interest” that Aristotle repeatedly
mentions of the slave and the master.133 Though the whole takes precedence over the mere part,
nonetheless they are bound to the same cause. As Aristotle points out, this symbiotic relationship
places a degree of responsibility on the master to ensure the quality of the slave’s work: “that
rule is better which is exercised over better subjects,”134 he notes, but later he warns, “The abuse
of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole… are the same.”135 He
then observes that the dynamic between slave and master can be one of friendly collaboration in
pursuit of the same aim, but that when the relationship “rests merely on law and force the reverse
is true.”136 To a certain extent, Aristotle advocates a “carrot” method of motivation,
acknowledging that willful cooperation of the slave yields better results than does pure “stick”
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motivation comprised primarily of punishment and coercion. In other words, the slave will be a
better slave if he or she is not just working because he or she is legally a slave, and so subject to
violent compulsion. Rather, the work will improve if the slave derives some benefit from it. By
this kind of logic, manumission could certainly serve as such a positive incentive for the slave to
be obedient and pleasing to the master—and in fact, Aristotle almost says so himself. Later in the
Politics, he remarks passingly, “Why it is advantageous that all slaves should have their freedom
set before them as a reward, we will say later.”137 Later never comes, but the reasoning probably
follows similar lines as that present in the first book of his same work.
For the two-thirds of the Delphic slave inscriptions which grant immediate freedom upon
payment to the manumitted slaves, manumission can perhaps be reconciled (though admittedly
tenuously) with Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery simply through Aristotle’s allusion to
positive reinforcement for slave labor and his own suggestion of an offer of freedom to slaves.
Manumission with paramone, however, can be understood through the first book of the Politics
in another way. The master-slave relationship is only one element of household management that
Aristotle discusses. The others are the relationship between husband and wife (predicated on the
natural urge to produce offspring, “that the race may continue”138) and, subsequently, between
father and children. The free man in the Politics rules over all three subjects—the slave, the wife,
and the children.139 The natural superiority of a free man over a slave, however, differs from that
over the wife and the child, for “the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it
is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.”140 Aristotle therefore emphasizes that
each of these subjects in the household is inferior to the free man in a distinctive way, the
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differences in their respective capacities and in the man’s rule over them not being in degree, but
in kind.141
There is one more element, however, which Aristotle says some consider to be equally a
part of household management, and that is wealth acquisition. After consideration, Aristotle
concludes that one kind of wealth acquisition is in fact a natural part of household management,
but that the other kind (that of exchange and commerce) is a separate art. The former is grounded
in one’s own property: “Property,” he says, “seems to be given by nature herself to all, both
when they are first born and when they are grown up.” He continues, “Of the art of acquisition
then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far as
the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things
necessary to life, and useful for the community or state, as can be stored.”142 Accumulating such
wealth as one’s own property yields (such as meat or materials from livestock or produce from
farming) is indeed, in Aristotle’s opinion, a natural part of managing a household, for nature
itself provides such products for the man and his household. He also makes it clear throughout
the first book of the Politics that slaves, as men’s possessions, are counted among men’s
property.143
Aristotle treats all of these components of managing a household separately—being the
master to a slave, being the husband to a wife, being the father to a child, and acquiring wealth
for the household’s upkeep and wellbeing. However, the manumission inscriptions in Delphi
present a circumstance in which all of them are combined. In agreements, discussed previously,
whereby the female manumitted slave agrees to bear enslaved children for the manumittor or the
manumittor’s heirs, the slave master is co-opting—for his or her own profit—the procreative
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relationship usually confined between husband and wife, and incorporating it into the slavemaster relationship. Following the reasoning of Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery,
manumission therefore enables the master to extend the use of the female slave by tapping into
her reproductive potential, and in doing so is simply engaging in the art of acquiring wealth
through the natural yields of his own property. That the freed female slave is by nature slavelike, and so more fit for slavery than for freedom according to Aristotle’s theory, is besides the
point; through this kind of paramone arrangement, the slave actually becomes more useful
through her capacities to the master in being freed than in continued enslavement. This point
extends as well to any older slave whose manumission money goes toward the purchase of a
younger and therefore more productive slave. As Hopkins also observes, “It was a paradox of
classical slavery that a master maximized his profit from a valuable slave by selling him
freedom.”144
Manumission can therefore conceivably be reconciled with the natural slave theory
Aristotle presents, however only to a limited extent. Aristotle’s presentation of these ideas hardly
holds up to careful scrutiny, with Garnsey even calling it “a battered shipwreck of a theory.”145
Aristotle confuses cause and effect with regard to slave characteristics and behavior, with the
result of dizzying circular logic, and he himself admits certain realities during his discussion
(particularly that a difference exists between slavery “by law”, through enslavement following
military defeat, and slavery “by nature”146). In truth, Aristotle’s theory, more than anything else,
is an envisioned ideal and justification for slavery, rather than an earnest investigation into the
true nature of the slave system. Presumably, knowing that populations defeated in war often
served as the sources of their slaves, this constructed dichotomy served also as some reassurance
144
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to the slave owning population that the masters would remain masters and were themselves
impervious to enslavement.
In light of this, what Garlan calls “a ‘rhetoric of otherness’” in Greek communities,
which “as a general rule turns the slave into the reverse of a free man—that is, a subversive
incarnation of incompleteness and disorder,”147 there is plenty of reason to believe that many
Greeks would have had difficulty in grappling with the ability of a slave to achieve freedom and,
thereby, the very personhood which by principle slaves were supposed to lack. Through
literature, art, philosophy, oratory, and, one would expect, general discourse, over centuries the
freeborn Greeks had strictly drawn the firm line between “slave” and “free”—what meaning did
it hold if someone could simply cross that line?
Boundary crossing was clearly a source of anxiety for the Greeks. Their collective unease
with categorical confusion is manifest in their cultural tales, in which hybrid creatures are often
disruptive forces. A conclusion that appears repeatedly in scholarship on monstrous beings in
Greek mythology is that a large part of the essential “monstrosity” of these fantastical characters
is their violation of limits and structure. Strauss Clay discusses the role of hybridity in such tales:
By definition, the monstrous is the anomalous, that which does not fit into usual
classifications or transgresses normal limits, and hence may be considered dangerous…
Generally speaking, Greek monsters are hybrid creatures that unite normally disparate
elements, for example, the human and the bestial…Occasionally also, as we shall see, the
monsters incorporate contradictory elements that violate fundamental categories, for
instance, mortal/immortal, young/old, and male/female.148
Meanwhile, the manumitted slave embodied the contradictory elements of free/slave. In his
seven theses on monster theory, Cohen makes observations similar to Strauss Clay’s:
This refusal to participate in the classificatory “order of things” is true of monsters
generally: they are disturbing hybrids whose externally incoherent bodies resist attempts
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to include them in any systematic structuration. And so the monster is dangerous, a form
suspended between forms that threatens to smash distinctions.149
The destructive power of these monsters lies primarily in the fact that, by being able to defy
categorization and leap boundaries, they reveal “that difference is arbitrary and potentially freefloating, mutable rather than essential.”150 Lack of categorization means lack of order, and lack
of order means chaos. It is not difficult to see how these fears and anxieties embodied by
mythological monsters could be the same ones underlying the more immediate danger of status
confusion that manumission posed to the constructed slave-free dichotomy. If a slave is able to
transcend his or her objectified status and join the ranks of the free population (albeit not with all
the legal and political rights of a citizen, although there are some manumitted slaves in the
Delphic epigraphy who received citizenship and so posed further theoretical difficulties)151 then
status is not fixed at all, but fluid—and in that case, the whole ideological system is challenged.
The divide between slave and master becomes blurrier, and the master’s position of dominance
becomes less secure.
This messiness of status that manumission presents is perhaps what Aristotle was trying
to tidy up through his theory of “natural slavery” in the Politics. Indeed, at multiple points in his
discussion he clearly indicates that he is responding to arguments that are contrary to his own, in
particular those that point out that circumstance—namely, warfare—is what enslaves many
freeborn people, who would therefore not be naturally suited to slavery.152 Of course, as
mentioned previously, in the end his explanation is unconvincing, circuitous and contradictory as

149

Cohen, “Monster Theory (Seven Theses),” in Monster Theory: Reading Culture ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) 6.
150
Cohen, 12.
151
SGDI 2133, 1844
152
Arist. Pol. 1255a.
May 2018, Final paper submitted for Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
Claudia Kassner, College of Arts and Sciences 2018, University of Pennsylvania

40

41
it is. Despite Aristotle’s efforts to reinforce the binary, the ideological tension is clearly still
present.
There is something also to be said for the agency the slave undertakes in his or her
manumission in the Delphic manumission epigraphy, as well as in similar systems of sacral
fictive sale. In opening up the possibility for the slave to work and save up money to purchase
his freedom, the master to a degree provided the slave the ability to achieve upward mobility. If
the act of crossing boundaries was a source of concern within the Greek “ideological fiction”153
surrounding slavery, the slave taking a deliberate and active role in this transition would
certainly be all the more upsetting to the system. Yet, as has been seen, the benefits of
manumission through payment by the slave, and especially through a paramone arrangement,
were high and probably enticing to the master. There were plenty of reasons why, even in the
face of these categorical dilemmas, a slave owner would want to make manumission possible for
his or her slaves.
So then how ideologically was it possible for a σώµα to become ἐλευθέρα καὶ
ἀνέφαπτος?154 The role of the god in the manumission may here have an explanation. Just as the
deus ex machina comes in to resolve swiftly the problems in Greek drama that seem
unresolvable, the god in manumission could perhaps have served a similar purpose. Like
monsters, deities do not adhere to rules, boundaries, or categorizations. Just as a monster can
disrupt the order, a god can restore it. If sacral manumission were simply a maneuver that
involved a third party to act on behalf of the slave—for the slave had no legal capacity—this
153
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could be accomplished by the intervention of another free person, as occasionally it was in
Athens (the case of Neaira is one such example).155 Similarly, if the god’s presence was meant
primarily to provide divine sanction to the transaction, the god could have been invoked in the
agreement rather than included as an active party in the transaction. It is possible that either or
both of these purposes accounts for the god’s role in sacral manumission; in fact, it seems likely
that the god was meant to serve multiple ends in manumissions. The involvement of the god in
the slave’s sale, however, does shift the procedure into the realm of the divine, and suggests that
some Greeks treated manumission as something separate from the ordinary dealings of their
human world.

Conclusion
The manumission inscriptions in the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, both in their high
number and in their largely formulaic components, testify to the development of at least one
standardized manumission procedure in Greece. However, this development should not serve as
an indication of progress in Greek society, despite the prospect of social mobility that it seems to
offer. Manumission was not, as it may appear, a departure from the Greek institution of slavery,
but rather an extension of it. The act of manumitting a slave could hardly have been born
primarily from generosity or fondness on the part of the slave owner; the conditions of too many
of the Delphic manumissions are too severe to grant this. This epigraphic collection presents the
many advantages, monetary profit and additional slave bodies among them, which slave owners
could enjoy by liberating a slave through the Delphic fictive sale—especially if it included a
paramone clause. In attaining his or her freedom through this process, a slave actually became
implicated in the exploitative slave system by supplying money that was presumably intended
155
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for the purchase of another slave and, for some unfortunate women, by becoming participants in
the negotiation of human lives as transferrable property. The involvement of a god in these
manumissions, however, suggests that there still remained an ideological barrier to the change in
the slaves’ status, but one that was worth overcoming to accrue the benefits. Therefore, a σῶµα
could become a person, but only on a case-by-case basis and with divine intervention.
Manumission, at least in Delphi, could certainly benefit the individual slave, but the practice
overall enabled the institution of slavery in Greece to thrive.
It is worth noting, however, that this paper does not consider and discuss the historical
context of this Delphic epigraphy. In the time period during which these sacral manumission
inscriptions first appear both in Delphi and elsewhere, regions all over Greece were experiencing
social and economic disorder; Alexander Fuks observes roughly seventy cases of “socialeconomic conflict and social-economic revolution” between the end of the fourth century and the
middle of the second century BCE, and central Greece was one region undergoing such unrest.156
Further investigation into how these manumission inscriptions fit within the events of this
turbulent period, and why the practice of sacral fictive sale arose in the last decades before Rome
took over, would surely shed more light on the slave sales to Apollo and on Greek manumission.
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